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Abstract
Recent work (Baluja, 2017) showed that using a
pair of deep encoders and decoders, embedding
a full size secret image into a container image
of the same size is achieved. This method dis-
tributes the information of the secret image across
all color channels of the cover image, thereby, it is
difficult to discover the secret image using conven-
tional methods. In this paper, we propose a new
steganalysis technique which achieves complete
recovery of the embedded secret in steganography
images. We incorporate a deep neural network
to decode an approximate estimate of the secret
image followed by a domain adaptation technique
based on generative adversarial networks which
transfers the decoded image into a high quality
RGB image with details visible to human eyes.
Our steganalysis technique can be served as an at-
tack model against which the security level of an
arbitrary embedded based digital watermarking
or a steganography algorithm can be evaluated.
Furthermore, our method can be used as a gen-
eral framework to decode a high quality image
message from a noisy observation of an encoded
message.
1. Introduction
Steganography is an art and science of embedding a hidden
message into a carrier signal. Unlike encrypted messages,
a steganography message appears to be a plain message to
a casual observer; it provides security through obscurity. It
is possible to combine cryptography with steganography,
e.g., by using a random secret permutation matrix as a key.
There are two basic components in steganography, these
are the secret message and the cover medium or container.
The messages could be text, audio, images or anything that
can be embedded in a bit stream. Images are usually the
candidate for the container signal due to their redundancy
which allows embedding secret messages more robustly and
less perceptible. Most steganography techniques lead to
a distortion in the container signal which can be used to
detect the existence of an embedded secret. Mielikainen
et al. proposed an improved version of least significant bit
(LSB) matching that enables embedding the same payload
as LSB matching but with fewer changes to the cover im-
age (Mielikainen, 2006). Pevny et al. (Pevny` et al., 2010)
introduced highly undetectable stego (HUGO), a new em-
bedding algorithm for spatial domain digital images based
on minimizing a distortion function in some feature space.
Steganalysis is the process of discovering the hidden in-
formation. The rapid growth of statistical analysis and
machine learning techniques has empowered steganalysis
mechanisms which are the biggest threat to embedded based
steganography algorithms. In (Fridrich et al., 2001) Fridrich
et al. proposed a reliable steganalysis method for detect-
ing least significant bit (LSB) nonsequential embedding in
digital images in which the length of the secret message
length was derived by analyzing the lossless capacity in
the LSB and the shifted LSB plane. In (Pevny` & Fridrich,
2007) Penvy et al. developed a feature set based on discrete
cosine transform (DCT) coefficients and Markov feature set
to train a multi-label classifier which determines if there
is an embedded secret in the container image for a few
steganography algorithms. In (Goljan et al., 2014) Goljan
et al. proposed an extension of the spatial rich model for
steganalysis of color images. The extended features are
designed to capture dependencies across color channels.
Recently, deep steganalysis has been proposed which en-
hances statistical analysis of the container images. In (Qian
et al., 2015), Qian et al., proposed a customized convolu-
tional neural network (CNN) for steganalysis to automat-
ically extract features that are useful for steganalysis as
opposed to complex handcrafted features. In (Zeng et al.,
2018) a new hybrid steganalysis was proposed using a CNN
framwork in which the CNN focuses on regions with com-
plex textures. The motivation is to attack adaptive steganog-
raphy algorithms which embed different number of bits in
different regions of the image depending the local texture
and complexity. To overcome some of these attacks, deep
steganography techniques have been introduced recently
(Hu et al., 2018) (Baluja, 2017). In (Hu et al., 2018) a new
deep steganography without embedding was introduced in
which the secret information is mapped into a noise vector
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and a generator neural network model is trained to generate
the carrier image based on the noise vector.
Most of the deep proposed methods attempted to convey a
small size secret message through a carrier signal. However,
in (Baluja, 2017), Baluja proposed a deep steganagraphy al-
gorithm which embeds a full-size secret image into a carrier
image of the same size. A pair of encoder and decoder deep
neural networks are simultaneously trained to create the
hiding and revealing processes. Baluja showed this method
compresses and distributes the secret image’s representation
across all of the available bits unlike to commonly used LSB
approach.
In this work, we analyze the steganography algorithm pro-
posed in (Baluja, 2017) and develop a new steganalysis
framework which not only determines the existence of the
embedded secret but also fully recovers the secret image
with high peak signal to noise ratio and similarity index. Our
steganalysis framework uses a deep CNN based decoder to
decode the secret image given the original cover and con-
tainer images, however, the decoded image is of poor quality
and many of its details are invisible to human eyes. To rem-
edy this, we transfer the poor quality decoded images into
high quality RGB images via a domain adaptation technique
known as pixel domain adaptation which was introduced in
(Bousmalis et al., 2017). This domain adaptation technique
transfers images from a source domain to images from a
target domain using generative adversarial networks. We
adapt the pixel domain adaptation model by adding addi-
tional cost terms to condition the generated images such
that it suits our steganalysis problem. We show that our
conditional generative adversarial model can learn the prior
information about the domain of secret images which is
effectively used to decode the embedded secret. Our simula-
tions show that using limited examples of the steganography
images, we can effectively train our steganalysis networks
with fairly good generalization performance to unseen data.
Also, since we do not make any assumption on the underly-
ing stenography encoder, our framework can be generalized
to analyze any embedded based deep steganography algo-
rithm that preserves the spatial information of the secret
image and does not incorporate any cryptographer key. As
a result, our steganalysis framework can be used as an at-
tack model against which the security level of an embedded
based steganography/digital watermarking technique can be
evaluated.
Moreover, with some modifications, our algorithm can be
treated as an image decoder algorithm which successfully
decodes images from a noisy channel with only few mea-
surements. This ultimately impacts the compression and
the transmission rates. In particular, using our decoder, the
same quality of image decoding can be achieved with lower
transmission rate than the data rate needed to successfully
decode the image with a conventional decoder.
2. Background and Related Work
In this section, we briefly review the deep steganography
introduced in (Baluja, 2017) and the pixel domain adaptation
technique proposed in (Bousmalis et al., 2017).
2.1. Deep Steganography
(Baluja, 2017) proposed a deep steganography method
which used three deep neural networks for encoding and
decoding the embedded secret image. Unlike previous meth-
ods, this method achieves hiding an N × N RGB secret
image into anN×N RGB cover image with minimal visual
distortion in the container image. A container image is a
cover image in which the information of the secret image is
hidden. Also, the discovery process is supposed to be with
minimal distortion, but it is not designed to be lossless. The
novelty of this method is that it essentially hides 10 to 40
times higher bit rates than the commonly used steganogra-
phy algorithms. They showed that the information of the
secret image is distributed across all color channels of the
container image and it is not only in LSB positions. There-
fore, it produces container images that are difficult to be
visually detected. However, as the author suggested the
existence of an embedded secret image could be determined
using statistical analysis.
The key idea in Baluja’s algorithm is to train the encoder
networks and the decoder network simultaneously. Baluja
proposed a steganography model with three components:
the Prep Network, the Hiding Network, and the Revealing
Network. Figure 1 displays the procedures in this model.
The Prep Network serves two main purposes: it resizes the
secret image to the size of the cover image if they differ in
size, and more importantly, it transforms the color-based
pixels to more useful features which are later to be used in
the embedding process. The Hiding Network takes the out-
put of the Prep Network and the cover image as inputs and
creates the container image. The goal is to create the con-
tainer image such that the difference between the container
and the cover images is visually imperceptible. Finally, the
Revealing Network which is used by the legitimate decoder,
receives only the container image and removes the cover
image to reveal the embedded secret image. Given a set of
cover and secret images, all three networks are trained simul-
taneously. One possible scenario to analyze a steganography
scheme is to assume the original cover image is accessed by
the attacker. (Baluja, 2017) showed that even though the dif-
ference between the original cover and container images can
reveal limited information about the embedded secret image,
revealing a visually meaningful copy of the original secret
image is difficult even with 20 times image enhancement
tools (Baluja, 2017).
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Figure 1. Illustration of the embedding and revealing procedures in the deep steganography algorithm (Baluja, 2017)
2.2. Pixel Domain Adaptation
In (Bousmalis et al., 2017) A team of researchers in Google
Brain proposed a new domain adaptation technique using
generative adversarial networks. The proposed technique
learns a transformation in the pixel space from one domain
to another. The input domain is called the source domain
and the destination domain is called the target domain. In
some sense, this technique is similar to the style transfer
(Isola et al., 2017) technique. However, following the style
transfer approach, a style of a single image is learned which
is then used to transfer the style of all the input images
to the learned style whereas the pixel domain adaptation
technique learns the style of an entire target domain and
adapts the source domain images to appear as if they were
drawn from the target domain. In (Bousmalis et al., 2017),
the assumption is that the differences between the source and
the target domains are primarily in low-level features which
could include variation in noise level, texture, resolution,
illumination, and color, as opposed to the high-level features
such as types of objects, geometric variations, etc.
3. The Proposed Steganalysis Framework
Our steganalysis model follows the oracle attack model
(T. Bandyopadhyay et al., 2013) in which we assume given
a pair of images (secret and cover images) the oracle outputs
the container image according to the deep steganography
algorithm in (Baluja, 2017). Our assumption is the number
of interactions with the oracle is limited. This means we
have access to a limited size steganography training dataset
to train our model. Our goal is to find the inverse function
which recovers the hidden image given original cover and
associated container images. The attack is successful if not
only the presence of an embedded secret is detected, but
also, the secret image is recovered with high peak signal
to noise ratio (PSNR) and high similarity to the original
secret image, for any arbitrary test container image that has
been produced by the same Steganography algorithm. It
is worth to mention that while we demonstrate our attack
against the deep steganography algorithm in (Baluja, 2017),
our steganalysis algorithm can be generalized to attack any
embedded-based steganography algorithm that preserves
the spatial information of the embedded image and does not
incorporate a cryptography key.
The key assumption in the steganography algorithm in
(Baluja, 2017) is that all three networks (Prep, Hiding and
the Reveal Networks) are trained simultaneously which
serves as the common randomness among encoders and
the decoder. In (Baluja, 2017), the encoders are basically
the Preparation and Hiding Networks and the decoder is
the Reveal Network. This common randomness allows fu-
ture communications to be fully perceived by the Reveal
Network but remain secret from an adversary’s decoder. In
our steganalysis model, we do not make any assumption on
the encoders used in producing the steganography images
which allows generalization of our attack to an arbitrary
steganography algorithm with similar assumptions. How-
ever, we assume we have access to some side information
regarding the target steganography algorithm. Specifically,
we assume we have access to a limited dataset which con-
tains tuples of (secret, cover, container) images where the
container images were produced by the target steganography
algorithm. These images are used to train our decoder.
Clearly, the absence of the common randomness in training
the decoder leads to losing some information related to the
embedded secret. Therefore, the decoded images are usually
of poor quality and features low dynamic range which make
it difficult for a human eye to perceive the details in the
image. In image processing, this situation is known as an
underdetermined problem. An underdetermined system is a
system of equations that relate input to output for which the
number of measurements (observations) is less than the num-
ber of unknowns. In our case, training the network using the
limited number of steganography images lead to the same
situation. A common approach to recover the signal from
a set of underdetermined measurements is to incorporate
some prior knowledge. This prior knowledge often assumes
a prior distribution over the feasible solutions. For instance,
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a prior Gaussian distribution results in L2 regularization
and Laplace distribution imposes L1 regularization. Other
examples with applications to images are Tikhonov regu-
larization (Tikhonov et al., 1995), Lasso (Tibshirani, 1996),
and dictionary learning methods (Aharon et al., 2006).
Regularization techniques in training deep neural networks
attempt to reduce overfitting to the training data by directly
assuming a prior distributions on the network weights. How-
ever, in our steganalysis problem, we are interested in solu-
tions certain characteristics, e.g. RGB images with high dy-
namic range, etc. Therefore, we assume a prior distribution
over the estimated images produced by the network which
indirectly implies a prior distribution over the networks’
weights. Specifically, we propose the use of a domain adap-
tation technique based on generative adversarial networks
(GANs) to learn the prior information regarding the secret
images. Although GANs do not directly aim to learn the dis-
tribution, they are trained to produce samples that look like
images drawn from the true distribution. GANs are known
for generating sharp images which make them a suitable
candidate for image enhancing tools. Motivated by the pixel
domain adaptation technique in (Bousmalis et al., 2017), we
use the GAN networks to transfer the poor quality decoded
images to the domain of high resolution recovered images
with high dynamic range which enables perceiving details
that otherwise were not visible to human eyes even after ap-
plying common image enhancing tools (Baluja, 2017). We
train the GAN networks by conditioning the solution of the
generators to be similar to the original secret image in the
least square sense. Our conditional GAN model ensures that
the GAN learns low level features such as colors, textures,
and resolution from the domain of possible secret images
while preserving the spatial information of the embedded
secret. This technique is similar to the pixel domain adap-
tion technique introduced in (Bousmalis et al., 2017) whose
goal was to transfer images from one domain (e.g., binary
MNIST domain) to another domain (e.g. colored MNIST-M
domain) while preserving the foreground information.
Our discriminator network is trained on both generated im-
ages and random images sampled from the domain of high
quality RGB images of the same size which share similar
characteristic as the space of secret images, e.g., space of
natural images. By balancing the coefficients of GAN’s
min-max cost function and the least square terms, we ensure
that the generator learns how to transfer the poor quality
decoded image to a high quality colored image with a rich
dynamic range of colors and high similarity to the original
secret.
3.1. Model
Our steganalysis network architecture is illustrated in Fig-
ure 2. The first part is our Decoding Network which takes
the original cover and container images and attempts to de-
code an estimate of the original secret images by simply
processing the differences between the two input image. We
use a 5 layer convolutional neural networks (CNN) with
ReLU activation functions for the Decoding Network. In
our training dataset, we used GIF images, therefore, input
and output images have 4 channels. The second part is our
generative adversarial networks which we interchangeably
refer to them as the Transfer and the Adversarial Networks,
respectively. It takes the output of the Decoding Network
and a random noise vector as inputs and outputs an estimate
of the secret image. The input and output images of the
Transfer Networks are similar in high level features (such as
objects in the picture), however, they differ in image quality,
noise level, colors, and textures. We adopt and customize
the domain adaptation technique in (Bousmalis et al., 2017)
for modeling our Transfer (generator) and Adversarial Net-
works. The distinction is that we do not use a task classifier
Network and the GAN’s cost function is customized to serve
our steganalysis purpose. Also, similar to the Decoding Net-
work, the Transfer and Adversarial Networks work with
images of 4 channels.
3.2. Training
Let Xs, Xc, Xc
′
, Xd and Xt represent the random vari-
ables denoting secret, cover, container, decoded, and trans-
ferred image variables, respectively. Additionally, let z
represent the random noise vector drawn from an i.i.d. Gaus-
sian distributions. Also, assume xs, xc, xc
′
, xd, xt, and z
represent realizations of the aforementioned random quanti-
ties. Let θD, θG and θA represent the trainable parameters of
the Decoding, the Generative (transfer), and the Adversarial
(discriminator) Networks, respectively.
Assume DθD : X
c×Xc′ → Xd denotes the parameterized
function representing the Decoding Network which. Also,
assume GθG : X
d×z→ Xt is the parameterized generator
function that takes the decoded image and the noise vector
as inputs and outputs a transferred image which is our final
recovered secret image. Assume Xr is the random variable
denoting real images with distribution Pxr (xr). A secret
image xs is sampled from Pxr (xr). Then, the Adversarial
network is represented by the parameterized function AθA :
Xr ∪Xt → {0, 1}, which decides whether its input image
is real. A fake image is an image produced by the generator.
Let us define Ld(DθD ) as the decoding loss, Lt(AθA , GθG)
as the domain transfer loss, and finally Lc(GθG) as the
conditional loss imposed on the images produced by the
generator. Also, assume α, β, and γ are trade-off parameters
in the overall cost function. Our goal is to optimize the
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Figure 2. Our proposed Decode and Transfer steganalysis model.
following total loss functions:
min
θD,θG
max
θA
αLd(DθD ) + βLt(AθA , GθG) + γLc(GθG)
(1)
The decoding loss function penalizes the distance between
the output of the decoder network xd and the corresponding
secret image xs in the least square sense. The decoding
loss ensures the high level features in the input image to the
generator network resemble the ones in the original secret
image. We have
Ld(DθD ) , Exd,xs
[∥∥xd − xs∥∥2
2
∣∣θD]
= Exc,xc′ ,xs
[∥∥DθD (xc, xc′)− xs∥∥22∣∣θD] (2)
The domain transfer loss function is the GAN’s min-max
loss as it was formulated in (Bousmalis et al., 2017). We
have
Lt(AθA , GθG) , Exs
[
log(AθA(x
s)
∣∣θA]+
Exd,z
[
log(1−AθA(GθG(xd, z)))
∣∣θA, θG],
which is equivalent to
Lt(AθA , GθG) , Exs
[
log(AθA(x
s)
∣∣θA]+
Exc,xc′ ,xs,z
[
log
(
1−AθA(GθG(DθD (xc, xc
′
), z))
) ∣∣∣∣θA, θG]
(3)
Lastly, the conditional loss function penalizes the mismatch
between the transferred (generated) image with the original
secret image. To further smooth the generated images, we
add the Total Variation (TV) penalty to the overall cost
function which further stabilizes the optimization over the
Figure 3. Illustration of an unregularized least square problem.
The Euclidean distance between the third and first images are
smaller than the distance between the first two images from the
left. However, the third image (the plain gray image) does not
contain any information regarding the first image.
domain transfer loss and gravitates the final solutions to less
noisy images. Therefore, the conditional loss function is
formulated as
Lc(GθG) , Exd,xs,xt
[∥∥xt − xs∥∥2
2
+ λ
∥∥∇xt∥∥2
2
∣∣∣∣θD, θG]
= Exd,xs,z
[∥∥GθG(xd, z)−xs∥∥22+λ∥∥∇GθG(xd, z)∥∥22∣∣∣∣θD, θG]
(4)
which can further be expanded in terms of input quantities
xc and xc
′
and function DθD (.). The gradient over x
t in the
TV cost is the two-dimensional differentiation operator on
the image space which penalizes the horizontal and vertical
image gradients and encourages smoother solutions.
Note that the TV loss and the domain transfer loss both
act as prior information to regularize the solutions of the
least square loss terms. Least square minimization for an
underdetermined problem is ill-posed and oftentimes does
not converge to the desired solution. Hence, it is crucial to
regularize the least square cost function. The toy example
in Figure 3 illustrates the issue with an unregularized least
square minimization. Also, it is important to train the Decod-
ing and the Transfer Networks simultaneously. This ensures
the regularization terms are imposed on both images pro-
duced by the Decoder and the Generator. The coefficients
λ, α, β, and γ are parameters of the model which should
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be tuned in order to obtain the desired balance among the
incorporated loss terms. Next section describes the details
of our implementation.
4. Empirical Evaluation
The training phase in our model consists of two steps. In
the first step, we train the deep steganography algorithm in
(Baluja, 2017) using samples of ImageNet. In the second
step, we train our steganalysis model using two sets of im-
ages. The first set is a small-sized dataset containing (secret,
cover, container) image tuples. The container images were
created by feeding the secret and cover images into a trained
deep steganography algorithm. The second set is a larger
dataset containing random sample images from ImageNet
which do not necessarily overlap with the previously used
training dataset. The second dataset is specifically used
to train the Adversarial Network (the Discriminator). It is
important to use a diverse dataset for the second set to avoid
overfitting to any specific dataset.
We used Adam optimization (Kingma & Ba, 2015) to train
all the networks in our model with parameters β1 = 0.9
and β2 = 0.999. Note that the Generator (the Transfer
Network) needs to produce sample images that not only
seem to be drawn from the space of real natural images,
but are also close to the original secret images in Euclidean
space. The additional cost terms, i.e., the conditional terms,
narrow the space of feasible solutions which in turn makes
it easier for the Discriminator (the Adversarial Network)
to win the min-max game early in training. To balance the
power between the two players, we trained the Generator
multiple times (12 times) after each round of updating the
Discriminator’s weights. Additionally, we added noise to the
Discriminator’s target domain dataset (the second training
set) which is the set of real natural images sampled from
ImageNet. We gradually decrease the noise variance as the
Generator catches up with learning. Similarly, the number
of training iterations at each round of updating the Generator
was gradually decreased as the Generator starts learning the
steganalysis procedure. Note that once training phase is
completed, the discriminator is detached from the model
and it is not used for the evaluation phase.
To evaluate the steganalysis performance of our model, we
tested our trained model on two different datasets. The first
dataset was created by taking 30 images with a smart phone.
The second dataset contains 60 samples of RGB images
randomly drawn from ImageNet Bird, Sport, and Flowers
categories. The test samples were not present in the training
dataset used to train our model. In both cases, we down-
sampled the images to 128 × 128 resolution. We created
container images by feeding the test dataset to the deep
steganography algorithm and then provided our steganalysis
model with the resulting container images as well as the
original cover images. We compared the recovered images
by our model with the original secret image to evaluate the
steganalysis performance. Our evaluation was performed
in both qualitative and quantitative forms. Specifically, we
used peak signal to noise ratio (PSNR) and the structural
similarity index (SSIM) for the final recovered images. Also,
we computed SSIM for the images obtained at the Decoder’s
output (The Transfer Network’s input) to determine how
much the domain adaption regularization has improved the
quality of the decoded images.
4.1. Simulation Results
Our numerical results are summarized in Table 1 which are
obtained for the two test datasets. Our results suggest that
the Transfer Network produces high quality colored revealed
secret images with high SSIM. Notice that the improvement
in SSIM for images produced by the Transfer Network over
the images produced by the Decoder Network is non-trivial
which highlights the effectiveness of our domain adaptation
regularization technique. It is worth mentioning that our
test results imply that the generator learns to not ignore the
noise input which ultimately leads to a better generalization
to different test datasets. For instance, in working with Ima-
geNet dataset, we noticed that though the final transferred
images were sharp images that were visually very similar to
the original secret images, they featured slight variations in
colors in the background of the Transferred images which
did not exist the original secret images or in the Transfer
Network’s input images. Also, we noticed that stopping
early in training helps the test performance, i.e., accepting
some error in training phase results in better generalization
to diverse test datasets.
Figure 5 displays samples of original secret and cover im-
ages from our created dataset in the top row and the corre-
sponding output images produced by our model. Specifi-
cally, Figure 5 (c) displays the decoded images produced
by our Decoder network and and Figure 5 (d) displays the
recovered secret images generated by our Transfer Network.
Note that the mean square error cost term is applied into
both the output of the Decoder Network and the Transfer
Network. However, while the output of the Decoder Net-
work features poor quality images with limited dynamic
range and colors, the output of the Transfer Network fea-
tures high quality images with rich colors and details visible
to human eyes. The Transfer Network has learned the low
level features of natural images such as colors and resolution
and adjusted the decoded images accordingly which helped
to recover the details of the embedded secret images. Addi-
tional samples of recovered secret images by our model are
displayed in Figure 4 along with the original secret images.
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Figure 4. Sample recovered secret images from a test dataset. Top row shows samples of original secret images drawn from our created
dataset and bottom row shows the corresponding final recovered secret images using our Decode and Transfer steganalysis model.
Table 1. Quantitative results on the performance of our steganalysis
algorithm. The PSNR and SSIM quantities are calculated by
comparison of the obtained images with corresponding original
secret images. A Transferred image is the final recovered secret
image which is an output of the Generator Network and a Decoded
image is the middle output at the output of our Decoding Network.
Test
Dataset
Mean
PSNR
Mean
SSIM
(Trans-
ferred)
Mean
SSIM
(Decoded)
Our dataset 25.22 dB 0.89 0.59
Sampled
ImageNet
dataset
26.44 dB 0.82 0.65
5. Discussion and Future Work
In this work, we introduced a new steganalysis algorithm
which targets deep embedded based steganography algo-
rithms. We analyzed a specific steganography algorithm in
which a full-sized secret image was embedded in the con-
tainer image of the same size. We showed that not only our
algorithm detects the embedded secret but it also fully recov-
ers the secret image. Our empirical evaluation showed that
with access to only a limited set of (secret, cover, container)
images produced by the target steganography encoder, com-
plete recovery of arbitrary secret images embedded by the
same encoder is achievable.
Note that our model does not make any assumption on
the steganography encoder, hence, our steganalysis algo-
rithm can be successfully applied to attack an arbitrary deep
embedded based steganography algorithm in which spa-
tial information of the secret image is preserved and no
cryptographic key was used. We propose our algorithm
to be adopted as an attack model in evaluation of future
deep steganography algorithms. A potential approach to
strengthen the secrecy of a steganography algorithm is to
take into account our attack model while training the en-
coder. For instance, using an adversarial training scheme in
which the encoder plays against our steganalysis model.
A key concept exploited in our steganalysis algorithm is
simultaneously training the Decoding and the Transfer Net-
works. While with a limited training dataset, the Decoding
Network is capable of partially decoding the secret images,
it cannot produce high quality decoded images with all
details visible to human eyes. In our model, we incorpo-
rated a domain adaptation regularization technique based on
GAN to learn the prior information and solve the decoding
problem jointly with the GAN’s min-max regularization.
The assumption here is that we have access to samples of
the distribution from which secret images were drawn to
train the Adversarial Network. Note that to train the Ad-
versarial Network, we do not use the secret images used
in training the target steganography algorithm. However,
we assume different samples of the underlying distribution
are known, e.g., samples of natural images which is a rea-
sonable assumption in most cryptoanalysis algorithms. The
Adversarial Network learns the pattern of real images drawn
from the secret distribution and through the zero-sum game
helps the Transfer Network (the generator) to transfer poor
quality decoded images to high quality RGB images with
rich dynamic range and vivid details. The domain adapta-
tion technique has been commonly used in style transfer
application. In (Bousmalis et al., 2017), the domain adap-
tation was used to transfer binary images of hand written
digits to colorful images of the digits. We introduced a new
application of domain adaptation technique to improve the
decoding process with application to steganalysis.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 5. Our steganalysis results on sample images from a test dataset. Figure a and b show random samples of cover and secret images,
respectively, drawn from our created dataset. Figure c displays the output of the Decoding Network in our model and Figure d displays
the output of our Transfer Notwork, i.e., the final recovered secret images.
One possible direction to extend this work is to apply our de-
coding and transfer techniques into a communication prob-
lem in which encoders and decoders are trained using only
partial measurements (observations) from the communica-
tion channel. It is possible to adjust the Decoding Network
to process the measurements and decode an estimate of the
transmitted image which then transferred to high quality
image by our Transfer Network. The side information that
is provided by training the Transfer network can be benefi-
cial in compression problems by reducing the bit-rate that is
required to successfully transmit and decode a high quality
RGB image (video). This model is essentially an example of
Wyner-Ziv problem in which the decoder has access to the
side information. Wyner-Ziv Theorem states that the input
message can be effectively decoded by transmitting with a
bit rate as low as the conditional rate of input message given
the decoder’s side information and this holds whether or not
the transmitter has access to this side information (Wyner
& Ziv, 1976). It would be interesting to quantify the band-
width reduction achieved by incorporating our decode and
transfer model in an image (video) communication problem,
with or without security constraints.
Decode and Transfer
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